The traditional view of tax holds that consumption taxes fail to tax the yield to capital, whereas income taxes do, leading to John Stuart Mill's criticism of the income tax as a "double tax" on wealth that is saved. A better analytic understanding illustrates that there are two types of consumption taxes. A prepaid consumption or (equivalently) wage tax indeed ignores the yield to capital. But a consistent progressive postpaid consumption tax gets at such yield, at the individual level, when but only when the returns to capital are used to elevate lifestyles in material terms. Such a tax allows "ordinary" savings that move around labor earnings, in constant dollar terms, to different periods of an individual's life, such as times of retirement or heightened medical or educational needs. Because a progressive postpaid consumption tax falls on the yield to capital at the right time -when its use at the individual level becomes manifest -all other taxes on capital, such as capital gains, gift and estate, and corporate income taxes, can and should be repealed, in the name of fairness.
I. INTRODUCTION
I write not to praise all tax-reductions but to bury one particular set of taxes.
Over a decade ago I began writing on the subject of comprehensive tax reform, in a piece titled The Uneasy Case for Wealth Transfer Taxes, 2 echoing the classic work on tax-rate progression by the law professors Walter Blum and Harry Kalven. 3 While I have never viewed the case for progressivity in tax burdens as especially uneasy, I have now come to see that the case for any tax on capital-that is, any direct tax on capital, a qualification to be made clear, below-is. Simply put, my argument is that there is no compelling reason of fairness or justice to tax capital qua capital, that is, the mere possession of material resources in the hands of an individual or, even more strongly, in the hands of an entity such as a corporation. We can and should abolish capital gains and other capital taxes under the income tax, wealth and wealth transfer taxes such as the gift and estate tax, and, perhaps especially and paradigmatically, corporate income taxes. As this is a claim that I suspect many if not most readers will find surprising, I shall limit my argument here to a fairness or moral argument against capital taxation the simple, lay argument against "double"
taxation, come what may, although capital can often be triply or quadruply taxed, at the individual level both when received and when invested, at the corporate or entity level, and again at the individual level when transferred. But many dollars are taxed multiple times in the flow of funds, and the number of times an element of value is taxed is simply less important than the rate at which it is taxed. A single high rate tax can be more burdensome than a panoply of trivial rate ones. My argument happens to be for a one-time tax on individuals, at the moment of spending or ultimate private preclusive use, but this is because I argue that this one time is the right time to make social judgments over the appropriate level of taxation, and not on account of any foundational constraint on the number of times individuals or elements of value can be taxed.
Rather my argument is about progressivity, the very thing that Blum and Kalven found "uneasy." The central, animating question is when judgments about progressivity in tax burdens should be made, which necessarily runs out to questions about how capital and its yield fit into a normatively attractive account of the fair distribution of tax burdens. I argue that, given that we are going to have a progressive tax system, in which the better-able-to-pay pay more, in percent terms, than the less-better-able-to-pay do-a proposition that I happen to accept as both factually accurate and normatively compelling, but, more to 10 The key insight is that we ought to tax people when they use their wealth-that is, spend-and not when they save, give, or die: our ordinary and reflective moral intuitions ought to consistently run out to the uses of material resources, and to not their sources. Capital is presently unused, unconsumed, wealth. It can be put to different uses at different times at the individual level. Society can reasonably make different judgments about the propriety of taxing different uses of capital. We can and should, that is, wait and make judgments about capital in the hands of individuals when their ultimate private preclusive uses of that capital become manifest.
These thoughts lead out naturally enough-with the aid of insights gleaned from tax policy tradition-to a specific form of comprehensive individuated tax, namely a progressive postpaid consumption one, a progressive spending tax in short. These are terms that I shall make clearer in due course.
The critical understanding is to see that such a tax is a tax on capital, at the individual level, when (but only when) capital is used to finance enhanced lifestyles or greater consumption of material resources-spending-and not when capital is used simply to move around in time, within or between generations, uneven labor market earnings. This is a compelling moral endpoint for tax. Once we get the major comprehensive tax system down right-from a strictly moral point of view-there is no longer any compelling reason for, and there are good reasons against, any of the traditional direct taxes on capital.
It is time to better explain and defend these claims.
II. THREE TYPES OF TAX

A. The Traditional View
Much of tax policy in the United States and elsewhere has been consumed with debating the relative merits of an income versus a consumption tax. 11 This debate has been framed by the so-called Haig-Simons definition of "Income,"
which holds, in essence, that Income equals Consumption plus Savings (I = C abstains from using the principal." 14 Consumption taxes, in contrast, are single taxes on the flow of funds into and out of a household. This way of putting the matter allows us to comprehend the two basic forms of consumption tax, which depend on the time when the single tax is levied. In one model, the tax is imposed up-front, and never again: a wage tax, or a so-called pre-paid or yield-exempt consumption tax. "Roth"
IRA's in the United States work on this model (pay tax now, never again). 15 The second form of consumption tax imposes its single tax on the back-end, when resources flow out of households: this is a sales tax, a postpaid, cash-flow or "qualified account model" consumption tax. Traditional IRAs in the United
States work this way (no tax now, only later).
Under flat or constant tax rates, the two principal forms of a consumption tax are in fact largely equivalent, a result that can be proven in relatively simple algebraic terms. 16 This equivalence has led to a confusion in the traditional view of tax, an over-quick equation of prepaid and postpaid consumption taxes. To see this equivalence and also to consider further Mill's celebrated "double tax" argument against the income tax, a simple numeric example proves illustrative.
Suppose that Ant and Grasshopper each earns $200 in wages, the tax rate This traditional view of tax is flawed.
B. A New Understanding
The traditional view's equivalence of prepaid and postpaid consumption taxes does not hold under non-constant or progressive rates. Once we assume at least some progression in the rate structure, the traditional understanding of consumption taxes is no longer accurate.
Progressive rates under most comprehensive tax systems work through a series of marginal rate brackets, that form, in mathematical terms, a step-function. To have a simple and illustrative structure in mind, suppose that no tax is paid on the first $10,000; followed by a 15% marginal rate on the next $40,000; a 30% rate on the next $50,000, and so on.
Income or Consumption
Marginal Tax Rate $0 -10,000 0% $10,000-50,000 15%
Over $50,000 30% Such a system effects progression in average or effective tax rates. A taxpayer who has $100,000 subject to this tax, for example, will pay total taxes of $21,000 ($6,000, or 15% of $40,000, plus $15,000, or 30% of $50,000), for an average tax rate of 21%; this is a higher tax rate than some one who makes $50,000, who pays $6,000 (15% of $40,000), or 12% in average tax.
The two forms of consumption taxes differ in their effects under progressive rates. Now there are three-not two-alternatives for the tax policymaker to choose. The differences come in when the tax falls, and how this impacts choices of work, savings, education, and so on, and, most important, in how the tax redistributes material resources. The time-path of earnings and spending, inflows and outflows-and with them, the role of capital transactions-now matters critically to the total tax burden. Consider each tax in turn.
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One, an income tax falls on all labor market earnings and on the yield to savings, at the time they come into a household. Savers are hurt by the "double taxation" of savings, whatever their intended or actual use. Individuals, like the athletes, artists, and the highly educated, who see their earnings come in relatively short, concentrated, bunches, are also hurt by the timing of the imposition of progressive rates.
Two, a prepaid consumption tax falls on labor market earnings alone, Andrews first pressed Mill's position, arguing that "the most sophisticated argument" for consumption taxation rested on preserving the pretax equality of spenders and savers. 19 This is an argument sounding in horizontal equity (comparing savers and spenders) and also taking an ex ante perspective (looking at the moment of decision to save or spend as the right time to make social judgments about fair taxation). Warren counterpunched by taking both an ex post (after the distribution of capital market returns) and a vertical equity perspective, arguing that those with greater "ability to pay" or (equivalently) more material resources ought to pay more than those with less: Ant has more material resources in the later, second period than Grasshopper does, so why shouldn't we tax her more? 20 Warren's arguments had prevailed, decades before he actually made them, at the dawn of the creation of comprehensive individual tax systems in the U.S. in the early years of the 20 th century, and elsewhere, later in the century.
Reformers actively desired an income tax because it included the yield to savings, and thus would impose an added burden on financiers and the like. 21 Those were, however, simpler times. As the income tax expanded in both scale, becoming a higher burden and more steeply sloped in its rate progression, and scope, reaching the majority of earners in the U.S. and elsewhere, things changed. 22 Lawmakers began to have second thoughts about double-taxing the yield to savings, anywhere and everywhere. A near century of experience with a so-called income tax in the U.S. and elsewhere in the developed world has by now shown a deep split about the normative propriety of taxing the yield to capital. More and more exceptions to the income tax's theoretical commitment to double-taxing savings have been piled on one another, whether by happenstance, inertia, deliberate policy plan, or mere mistake; examples include tax-favored medical, education, and retirement savings accounts, the nontaxation of "unrealized" appreciation, and the rather systematic exclusion of the financial gains from personal residences. 23 The result is that we now observe "hybrid" taxes, perched-typically, uneasily-between an income tax model, with its double tax, and a consumption tax, with its principled nontaxation of savings. Trouble is, the compromises to bring about this state of affairs have been effected without suitable normative or practical reflection, resulting in a tax system in which the well-endowed-the capitalist class-can live well and consume away, tax-free. We are neither favoring savings nor effecting a fair distribution of tax burdens across taxpayers; individuals who can live off the yield to capital quite simply need pay no tax. 24 Consider a simple example, drawn from my longer work. 25 Take the case of Artful Dodger, who happens to have the sum of one million dollars. It does not matter much for the illustration how Dodger got this wealth. If he earned it via wages, he would have paid income and payroll taxes on it; if he received it as a gift or as the proceeds of life insurance, for example, he would never have paid tax on it, and, depending on the circumstances of his benefactor, it is possible that no one ever paid tax. 26 The point is that Dodger need never pay tax again.
He can invest his million in non-income producing property, such as growth stocks; such property rises in value without producing taxable cash each year.
heirs can sell their inherited property, tax free, and pay off Dodger's debts, continuing the pattern with any value that is left over. The details vary, but the basic point is that those who live off the fruits of financial capital need pay no federal taxes in the United States, at least, while those who live off human capital-those who get paid for their labor-are hit, and hit hard, by income and payroll taxes, combined. Ordinary moral intuitions thus agree with both Andrews's horizontal equity position, and Warren's vertical equity one, through these two norms, the ordinary savings and yield-to-capital ones. Savers should not be penalized for saving, not consuming, in the ordinary course of their lives, for rainy days or times of greater need or urgency, but the yield to capital is also an increment of value that should not be simply and completely ignored in the tax base. The trick is to design a tax system that implements both norms, simultaneously,
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IV. TWO USES OF SAVINGS
With this new normative vocabulary in hand, we can now return to the discussion of the uses of material resources, focusing especially on the uses of capital. Consider in financial terms how most of us live out our lifetimes. As any parent knows full well, we spring forth into the world nearly fully formed as consumers: we cost money from the get-go. But (as any parent also knows)
we do not earn anything for quite some time. When we do start earning, we have to earn more than we spend (let us hope!), to pay off the debts of our youth, including school loans, and to set aside funds for our retirement, so that we do not have to keep working all the days of our lives. Our lives look like one fairly steady consumption profile, from cradle to grave, financed by a lumpy period of labor market earnings concentrated in midlife. If we lived as islands, unto ourselves, we would have to balance the books on our own account, borrowing in youth, first paying off our debts and later saving for retirement in our mid-life, spending down in old age. Financial intermediaries such as banks and insurance companies would help us to effect these results. In practice, many families work as more or less informal annuities markets, between generations.
Thus our parents pay for our youths, and we pay for our children's youths; we also stand ready to pay our parents back, should their needs exceed their resources in their old age. 27 And so on.
In this stylized depiction of a typical life, note two broad uses of savings.
One is to smooth out consumption profiles, within lifetimes or across individuals-to translate uneven labor market earnings into even consumption flows. We do this by borrowing in youth and saving for retirement-and/or other times of special need, such as health and education demands-in mid-life.
We can do this using third party financial intermediaries, or within the family, as noted above: perhaps we pay for our children's youth, and they pay for the youths of their children, our grandchildren, in a recurring "overlapping generations" model. would thus tax her, on her spending. A downward shift, in contrast, occurs when our Ant's beneficence or bad fortune means that she will live at a lower-less costly-lifestyle than she otherwise could, all measured off the baseline of her smoothed out labor market earnings profile alone.
The two norms considered in the prior section map up perfectly with these two uses of capital. Smoothing effects the ordinary-savings norm; shifting the yield-to-capital one. Ordinary moral intuitions, reflected in a near-century of experience with actual tax systems, suggest that society ought not to burden smoothing transactions with a double tax, but that the yield to capital is an element of value that can properly be taxed when used to enable a "better," more expensive lifestyle. This is not envy. It is not, that is, that the rich should be penalized, or that those who earn wealth from capital should be brought down and laid low. It is, rather, the sensible thought that the yield to capital is an increment of value, that deserves to be counted in one's resources available to pay tax, except when savings are used simply to move values around in time.
Such movements in time are one thing, greater material enjoyment is another thing. It is all, in essence, about the fair timing of tax. A simple example helps to make points clearer. One taxpayer, Steady
Earner, makes and consumes $50,000 a year for the relevant years of comparison, say beginning in her early 20s. A second taxpayer, Lumpy Earner, stays in school until he is 30, and then makes $100,000 a year. But Lumpy Earner spends $50,000 a year, too, using prudent borrowing and saving to effect this result. 28 Finally, Trust Fund Baby lives off his parents' fortune, getting and spending $50,000 a year (which represents a 5% yield off a trust corpus of $1,000,000, small change for the rich today). How do the three taxes affect these three individuals, under the simple progressive rate structure posited above?
An ideal progressive income tax burdens all three taxpayers, but falls most heavily on Lumpy Earner, because of the timing of the imposition of the progressive rates. In the simple rate structure posited above, Lumpy pays 21% A progressive postpaid consumption tax, in contrast, falls equally on all three taxpayers, at the 12% level.
Note that, should any of the three taxpayers get lucky in the capital markets-win the lottery, say, or simply get extra high returns from investments-then the progressive postpaid consumption tax stands ready, at the wait, to tax that good fortune when and as it is used to enhance, or elevate, their lifestyles.
In sum, whereas an ideal income tax double taxes all savings, whatever their use, and a prepaid consumption tax ignores all savings, again whatever the use, a consistent progressive postpaid consumption tax splits the difference, in a principled way, and by design. It allows taxpayers to lower their taxes by smoothing, but it falls on the yield to capital when such yield is used to enhance lifestyles. This reflects simple, commonsensical attitudes about life, income, and savings. These attitudes are reflected imperfectly under the status quo in the United States and other advanced Western democracies, with a nominal income tax rife with pro-savings provisions for retirement, health, and education.
V. THE CASE AGAINST (DIRECT) CAPITAL TAXATION
The better understanding of the analytics of tax that we have now attained can lead to a dramatically simpler tax system that is at the same time far fairer, one that perfectly incorporates the ordinary moral intuitions about savings-namely that savings for some purposes, which we can broadly call smoothing, should not be burdened twice over, but that savings that enable a higher material lifestyle can and should be subject to tax: a tax that is, some 
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The tax law would thereby, however surprisingly, look much like it does today, in the United States at least. There would be annual wage reporting from one's employers and annual income tax returns like dreaded the 1040 forms used in the U.S.. Instead of the myriad of tax-favored accounts we observe today, however, there would be a single, unlimited savings account for every individual, which we can call, to make points clear, a Trust Account. All contributions to these Accounts would be deductible, and all withdrawals from them would be includible in taxable "consumed income." Debt that was used to consume, as dissavings, would likewise be taxable; repayments of principal, as positive savings, would be deductible. In such a fashion, the law would work out the logic of "Income minus Savings." Ordinary saving for retirement would lower the burden of taxation, by changing the time of taxation from one's high-earning, midlife years, to the smoother, lower levels of one's consumption.
Saving for medical needs or other special circumstances, such as education, could also lower the burden of one's taxes, especially if the law imposed a lower (or no) taxation on these uses, parallel to the United States' current, limited, deduction for extraordinary medical expenses. 30 Lumpy Earner, for example, who makes $100,000 in wages but saves $50,000 for his retirement, would pay tax on $50,000
(100,000 -50,000). Trust Fund Baby would pay tax on the $50,000 he withdrew from his Trust Account. And Steady Earner, who neither borrows nor saves, would pay tax on her earnings, which equal her consumption, $50,000. Note that there is no need whatsoever to tally up particular items of expenditure; this is all quite general. To this base, a progressive rate structure can apply, like that illustrated by Table 1 .
The important point to see is that this progressive postpaid consumption tax would, in and of itself, make for an individuated tax on capital, when, but only when, capital is used to enhance lifestyles. No other tax on capital would therefore then needed-and, in part because any other tax on capital is not so individuated, and hence risks falling on ordinary savings as well as the yield to capital, all "direct" taxes on capital should be eliminated.
Consider first the role of "second" taxes on the yield to capital under the basic individuated tax system, such as capital gains under the income tax. These are simply not needed under a consistent progressive postpaid consumption tax.
If a taxpayer sells an asset and reinvests the proceeds, she has continued to save, and there is no reason to tax her-yet; this can all be done inside her Trust Account. On the other hand, any mechanism to finance her lifestyle-wages, the ordinary yield to capital (interest, dividends and the like), someone else's beneficence, the proceeds of sales of capital assets or, for that matter, borrowing against present assets or future earnings-is taxed, at the moment of private preclusive use, when withdrawn from the Account. Whether or not to sell an asset can be left to the personal decisions of investors, for efficiency; how to tax the proceeds of investments can be left to the moment of consumption, when society can better judge what kind of lifestyle these investments enable.
Consider next the gift and estate tax. The current system in the United
States at least aims to "backstop" the income tax, which tax is (in ideal theory)
supposed to burden savings, by levying a hefty tax on those decedents who die with large estates or those persons making large inter vivos gifts. This tax is obviously desired as a matter of fairness. But its very existence encourages the rich to consume more, and die broke, whether they spend on themselves or their heirs. 31 In contrast, a consistent progressive postpaid consumption tax never taxes savings directly. Assets saved in the Trust Accounts thus have a zero "basis" in technical tax terms, meaning that they have not yet been taxed, and thus all proceeds from their sale or disposition are subject to tax, if and when consumed. 32 The Trust Accounts can therefore be passed on to heirs on life or at death, without the moment of transfer itself triggering tax. On the other hand, and at a different time, spending by the heirs will generate tax, and under a progressive rate structure, on withdrawal from the Accounts. A consistent progressive postpaid consumption tax does not need, in principle, a separate gift and estate tax, because the very design of the tax entails an accessions or inheritance tax-Trust Find Baby pays the progressive spending tax. Note, by the way, that intergenerational transfers, just as within-generation ones, can effect smoothing or shifting: parents can help to equalize spending across generations, or can self-sacrifice to allow their children to live better. In the latter, shifting, case, the familial burden will increase under a consistent progressive spending tax; in the former, smoothing, case, it will decrease. This pattern has normative appeal.
Finally, parallel─though, indeed stronger-arguments can be made against a separate corporate income tax. The problems with this tax begin with its uncertain incidence: since corporations are not real people, they do not really pay taxes. They must pass these on. A corporate tax falls on workers and consumers, on capital generally, or on some combination thereof. 33 To the extent it falls on ordinary workers and consumers, a corporate income tax's claims to fairness are fairly obviously questionable. But even to the extent such a tax falls on capital, it cannot do so in any individuated way. Savers bear the burden of the corporate income tax whether they are rich or not, saving for lifetime needs or emergencies or to support a high-end lifestyle. Once again, under a consistent, progressive, postpaid consumption tax-which falls on the yield to capital as a source of personal consumption, making individuated judgments at that time-such a tax is not needed.
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The elimination of these other taxes follows from the principle of a consistent progressive postpaid consumption tax: to tax individuals as they spend, not as they work, save, give, or die. Such a tax will enhance simplicity, transparency, and efficiency while promoting fairness. Specifically in terms of capital, the tax would apply to the yield to capital, when but only when it is appropriate to do so. The rich would not be let off the social hook; their tax would come due when, as, and if they spent wealth on themselves. Progressivity could be maintained, even strengthened.
VI. CAPITAL AS POWER
An argument that supports direct capital taxation, manifest in a recent rise in scholarly reflection over a separate freestanding wealth tax, 34 pivots on the idea that capital itself-the mere possession of material resources, unspent-is a phenomenon that bears taxing. I have long written that this argument, as an objection to a consistent progressive postpaid consumption tax, is confused. 35 To see why requires us to take a deeper, better look at what it is that might be troubling to the wider society in the stock of capital's resting in private hands.
Two potential problems come to mind.
One possibility is that the capital today represents potential 
VII. ONE LAST UNEASY ARGUMENT
Another argument for direct capital taxation, pressed particularly vis a vis the corporate income tax, bears noting. It is that these taxes are desired precisely because they are hidden. People do not notice the true incidence of the corporate tax, and this allows governments to have a higher revenue base than they otherwise might.
This may at first seem a weak argument to press in the name of fairness, resting as it does on trickery, and coming in the face of the near-certain regressive incidence of the tax. But recent research that I and others have conducted does indeed suggest that perhaps the best way to effect redistribution of material resources to the poor is to have large relatively flat taxes, accompanied by progressive redistributive expenditure programs. 36 It is, after all, the net of tax and transfer programs that matters to any robust and compelling sense of distributive justice. So perhaps we want capital taxes, bad as these levies are, to get the money with which to effect social justice, on the spending side of the government's tax and spend scheme.
In the end, this might be a compelling practical political argument for corporate taxation, though not for gift and estate taxes or capital taxes more generally, and though it bears noting that corporate taxes have been declining as a source of revenue in all advanced states, and may not, in the end, be worth the candle. But we, as philosophers and scholars, should know this argument for what it is, or label it as such. It bears noting that "hidden" taxes have real costs:
the corporate income tax affects prices, distorts decisions, and effects no compelling distributive goal, once a suitably designed progressive spending tax is in place at the individual level. And so maintaining it, even to get funds for doing "good," is not without cost; in a perfect world, we could generate all the revenues we need for just social spending programs by just social taxation schemes. In public finance as in life, we can pay a dear price for our illusions.
VIII. CONCLUSION
Advocates for fairness in taxation have long supported an income tax, precisely because it gets at the yield to capital, and because, they think, consumption taxes do not. In fact, a better understanding of the analytics of tax It turns out that this is the right thing to do. Not only can we derive that from first principles, and the ordinary-savings and yield-to-capital norms, but we can also observe it from a century of practice with a so-called income tax.
Whatever one thinks of ideal taxation, we ought to note well the fact that we have never had, and almost certainly never will ever have, an ideal income tax in practice, or anything rather too close to it, at all. The real debate in practical tax politics is and always has been over what form of consumption taxation to have.
And here the stakes are large and dramatic for the fate of progressivity in tax, and point towards a consistent progressive postpaid consumption tax.
The final insight is that, once we have gotten the comprehensive tax system down right, from a strictly fairness point of view-by adopting a consistent progressive postpaid consumption tax-we no longer need any direct taxes on capital. This is not because capital per se is good, or because of a naïve horizontal equity approach to policy. Rather it is because we are now taxing the yield to capital, in an individuated way, at the right time. We can and should repeal all capital taxes under the income tax, the separate gift and estate tax, and corporate taxes of all forms. This will add considerably to the simplicity, administrability, and efficiency of the tax system. But these have not been the point, here. It is, rather, the fair thing to do. 
